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OFFSHORING JOBS? MULTINATIONALS AND U.S. MANUFACTURING
EMPLOYMENT
Ann Harrison and Margaret McMillan*
Abstract—Using firm-level data collected by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, we estimate the impact on U.S. manufacturing employment of changes in foreign affiliate wages. We show that the motive for
offshoring and, consequently, the location of offshore activity, significantly affects the impact of offshoring on parent employment. In general,
offshoring to low-wage countries substitutes for domestic employment.
However, for firms that do significantly different tasks at home and
abroad, foreign and domestic employment are complements. These offsetting effects may be combined to show that offshoring by U.S.-based multinationals is associated with a quantitatively small decline in manufacturing employment.

I.

Introduction

D

URING the past three decades, domestic manufacturing employment of U.S.-based multinationals has
fallen steadily (table 1). Between 1982 and 1999, affiliate
foreign employment as a share of total employment of these
U.S. multinationals increased, climbing from 30% to nearly
44% of their labor force. These parallel developments have
led critics of globalization to conclude that U.S. firms are
cutting employment at home and shifting employment
abroad. Concerns about offshoring have intensified as
newly released data indicate a further decline in manufacturing employment by both U.S.-based multinationals and
for the U.S. economy as a whole.
Why are the employment consequences of offshoring so
important? After all, most trade models predict that the factor reallocations resulting from globalization are associated
with net gains in aggregate welfare. First, there are likely to
be short-run costs of adjustment as workers may not quickly
leave one type of employment for another. These types of
costs have been formalized in trade models where factors
are specific to the production of certain types of goods. To
the extent that unskilled workers are more likely to suffer
transitional losses, these are important distributional consequences and need to be carefully identified and understood.

Received for publication September 23, 2008. Revision accepted for
publication January 28, 2010.
* Harrison: University of California, UC Berkeley, and NBER; McMillan: Tufts University and NBER.
For assistance with data, we thank Raymond Mataloni, Fritz Foley, and
Stanley Watt. For helpful comments, we thank David Card, the fellows at
the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, Larry Katz, Francis Kramarz,
seminar participants at the BEA, Columbia University, the University of
Michigan, Stanford, UC Berkeley, Yale University, the IMF, the Paris
School of Economics, the University of Maryland, Pierluigi Balduzzi, and
two anonymous referees. For financial assistance, we gratefully acknowledge the National Science Foundation. M.M. acknowledges the Radcliffe
Institute for Advanced Study for both financial support and time to devote
to this project. The statistical analysis of firm-level data on U.S. multinational companies was conducted at the International Investment Division,
Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce
under arrangements that maintain legal confidentiality requirements. The
views expressed in this paper are our own and do not reflect official positions of the U.S. Department of Commerce. We gratefully acknowledge
research assistance from Joan Hamory, Clair Null, and Andrew Waxman.

Second, these short-run costs could lead to an erosion of
support for free trade, as discussed by the chair of the Federal Reserve (Bernanke, 2006). And finally, understanding
the magnitude of these changes is important for the design
of social safety nets. For example, on October 22, 2004, the
U.S. Congress passed the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004. The act contains a provision to encourage profit repatriation back to the United States by multinationals—explicitly for the purpose of job creation at home. Yet the evidence linking offshore activities to falling domestic labor
demand is in fact unclear. Bernanke (2006) emphasizes the
need to identify losers and compensate them for the costs of
increasing competition as a way to ensure that support for
free trade continues.
In this paper, we use a standard labor demand equation to
identify the effect of offshoring on home employment. We
allow different degrees of substitution (or complementarity)
depending on the motive for offshoring and whether offshoring takes place in high- or low-income affiliate locations. We differentiate between the motives for offshoring
using the following measures of vertical integration
between parents and their affiliates: imports from foreign
affiliates, exports for further processing, exports for resale,
and export platform offshoring. At the same time, we control for other confounding changes, such as other factor
price changes, demand shocks, and technological change.
To address the possibility that methodological differences
might be driving the conflicting results described above, we
also estimate wage elasticities using a translog specification
and a constant elasticity of substitution specification.
We find that the insights derived from trade theory go a
long way toward explaining the apparently contradictory
evidence on the relationship between offshoring and
domestic manufacturing employment. Before controlling
for the degree of vertical integration, we find that affiliate
employment in low-income countries substitutes for domestic employment: a 10 percentage point reduction in wages
in low-income countries is associated with a 1% reduction
in U.S. parent employment. However, for parents that
export significant amounts of goods to low-income countries for further processing, foreign wage reductions are
associated with an increase in domestic employment. Conversely, for parents that export significant amounts of goods
to high-income countries for further processing, foreign
wage reductions are associated with decreases in parent
employment. Using data on affiliate employment composition in the computers and electronics sector, the sector with
the highest share of exports for further processing, we show
that the results differ across high- and low-income affiliate
locations, in part because the tasks performed in these locations are very different. Tasks performed by affiliates in
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TABLE 1.—EMPLOYMENT BY U.S. MULTINATIONALS, 1982–1999

Parent employment
BEA manufacturinga
Our sampleb
Affiliates
Employment in high-income countries
Employment share of total in high-income countries
Employment in low-income countries
Employment share in low income countries
Total affiliate employment
Employment share of all affiliates

1982

1989

1994

1999

11,758
10,689

10,706
9,668

9,622
9,104

7,954
7,564

2,595
18%
1,064
7%
3,659
26%

3,171
22%
1,405
10%
4,576
32%

3,048
22%
1,584
12%
4,632
34%

2,903
24%
1,868
15%
4,772
39%

a

Mataloni (1995) and Mataloni and Yorgason (2006). Employment is industry of parent and includes petroleum extraction.
Our totals differ and/or R&D

b

high-income locations are similar to those performed in the
United States, while tasks performed in low-income locations are significantly different or complementary to those
performed in the United States.
We also find that imports from foreign affiliates do not
affect the relationship between domestic employment and
affiliate wages. This is true regardless of whether the
imports come from high- or low- income countries. This is
possibly due to data limitations, which we discuss in the
text. We find some evidence that exports for resale are complementary with domestic employment. Finally, we show
that export platform offshoring is a prominent feature of
almost all industries and firms. Thus, we are unable to separately detect a significant effect of export platform offshoring on domestic employment.
By combining our point estimates with changes in variable means, we show that offshoring is not the primary driver of declining domestic employment of U.S. manufacturing multinationals between 1977 and 1999. Declining
domestic employment of U.S. multinationals is primarily
due to falling prices of investment goods such as computers,
which substitute for labor. Other contributing factors include
rising domestic wages and increasing import competition.
Our research highlights both the importance of heterogeneous firm responses to opportunities for direct investment
abroad and the need to account for other avenues through
which international competition affects U.S. labor demand.
Our results are consistent with the literature that focuses
on the impact of international trade on U.S. jobs. Revenga
(1992) finds a negative impact of changes in import prices
on U.S. employment growth. Katz and Murphy (1992) also
find that increased import competition negatively affected
relative labor demand in the United States, particularly in
the 1980s with the increase in the U.S. trade deficit. Borjas,
Freeman, and Katz (1997) find that increased trade with
developing countries depresses wages at the bottom of the
income distribution. Bernard, Jensen, and Schott (2006)
examine the impact of U.S. imports on both the survival
and employment of U.S. manufacturing firms. They find
that imports harm U.S. manufacturing employment only
when those imports are from low-wage countries.
This paper also helps to clarify the reasons for the discrepancies in results across previous papers on this topic. First,

previous studies have asked different questions. For example, Brainard and Riker (2001) use a factor demand
approach to show that labor employed by affiliates overseas
substitutes at the margins for labor employed by parents at
home, but they emphasize that the results differ depending
on geographic location. In particular, they emphasize strong
substitution between workers at affiliates in developing
countries, with workers in countries like Mexico and China
competing for jobs with each other. Borga (2005) and Desai
Foley, and Hines (2009) ask a different set of questions.
Borga (2005) examines simple correlations between measures of offshoring and parent employment and makes no
attempt to disentangle the relative importance of offshoring
compared to other factors that determine domestic employment. Desai et al. (2009) focus on the correlation between
expansion in activity at home and abroad. They show a
positive association between growth in domestic investment, assets, employment, and total compensation for multinational parents and their foreign affiliates.
Second, previous studies have used a variety of different
methods. While Desai et al. (2009) adopt an instrumental
variable approach to estimate the association between
growth in employment at home and abroad for U.S. multinationals, Muendler and Becker (2009) and Brainard and
Riker (1997) estimate translog factor share equations. Using
German multinational data, Muendler and Becker (2009)
also explore the importance of selection into affiliate locations for the consistency of their estimates.
Third, previous empirical studies on employment and
offshoring have not distinguished the differing motivations
for foreign investment. Theoretical models of trade and foreign investment imply that different types of foreign investments will be associated with different kinds of effects on
domestic labor demand. There is currently no agreement in
the theoretical literature on whether horizontally integrated
foreign investment (H-FDI) or vertically integrated foreign
investment (V-FDI) is more likely to lead to domestic job
losses.
An early version of the V-FDI model is presented in
Helpman (1984). In the Helpman framework, there is an
equilibrium where the parent (the headquarters) imports
low-wage goods and exports headquarters services. In such
a world, domestic demand for labor to produce the homoge-
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neous good in the headquarters country would fall, and
wages would continue to decline until factor price equalization is eventually achieved. Such a framework implies that
under some initial relative endowments, V-FDI can be associated with intrafirm imports of low-wage goods, largely
invisible exports from headquarters of intangibles such as
management skills and knowledge arising from productspecific R&D conducted at home, falling domestic demand
for unskilled labor, and falling domestic wages.
Markusen (1989) presents an alternative model in which
V-FDI is associated with rising labor demand at home. In
Markusen, domestic and foreign specialized inputs are complements by design, and trade generates welfare gains by
increasing the number of specialized inputs (which are produced under increasing returns to scale technology) available. There are also models that focus on the implications
for labor demand of V-FDI versus H-FDI. Markusen and
Maskus (2001) show how different incentives for foreign
investment lead to different organizational structures, which
should produce different degrees of substitution between
employment at home and abroad. Horizontal multinationals, defined as firms that produce the same products in
different locations, are primarily motivated by trade costs to
locate abroad.1 For H-FDI, investment abroad substitutes
for parent exports, and foreign affiliate employment should
substitute for home employment. In their framework, VFDI leads to complementarity between trade and foreign
investment. Vertically integrated enterprises are motivated
by factor endowment differences (and, consequently, factor
price differences in a world where there is no factor price
equalization) to locate different components of production
in different locations. As Brainard and Riker (1997) pointed
out, one implication of this type of modeling approach is
complementarity between parent and affiliate employment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
section II, we describe the Bureau of Economic Analysis
data on outward direct investment and our choice of sample. Section III describes the empirical framework and discusses econometric issues. Section IV presents the results,
and section V concludes.
II.

The BEA Data

We analyze firm-level surveys on U.S. direct investment
abroad, collected each year by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis (BEA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The
BEA collects confidential data on the activities of U.S.based multinationals, defined as the combination of a single
U.S. entity that has made the direct investment, called the
parent, and at least one foreign business enterprise, called
the foreign affiliate. We use the data collected on majorityowned, nonbank foreign affiliates and nonbank U.S. parents
for the benchmark years from 1982 and 1999. These bench1
For simplicity, we will occasionally refer to horizontally integrated
firms as horizontal firms and vertically integrated firms as vertical.
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mark years (1982, 1989, 1994, and 1999) include more comprehensive information than the annual surveys do.2
Creating a panel using the benchmark years of the BEA
survey data is a nontrivial task for several reasons. First, not
all firms are required to report to the BEA, and reporting
requirements vary across years. Second, we must consider
the implications of the changes to the Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) codes in 1972 and 1987 and the switch
from SIC codes to the North American Industrial Classification System (NAICS) codes in 1997. The fact that parents
are allowed to consolidate information for several affiliates
in one country on a single form calls for special care in the
aggregation and interpretation of affiliate-level data.
All foreign affiliates with sales, assets, or net income in
excess of a certain amount in absolute value must report
their data to the BEA. This amount was $3 million in 1982,
1989, and 1994 and rose to $7 million in 1999. In addition,
a new reporting requirement was imposed on parents in
1999. Parents whose sales, assets, or net income exceeded
$100 million (in absolute value) were required to provide
more extensive information than parents whose sales,
assets, or net income fell below that level.3 To determine
whether the changes in reporting requirements made small
firms overrepresented in our sample in the early years, we
imposed a double filter on the data using the uniform cutoff
for affiliates (based on the strictest reporting requirement of
$100 million in 1999) of $5.59 million in 1982 U.S. dollars
and $79.87 in 1982 U.S. dollars for parents. As it turns out,
the reporting requirements were large enough that imposing
the filter on the data makes little difference on our initial
results. Therefore, we use all of the available data.
Finally, we face selection issues with our sample of manufacturing firms.4 We keep those parents whose primary
2

While the BEA collects annual data on U.S. direct investment abroad,
these data do not include all the variables we need and can find in the
benchmark years.
3
Parents that do not meet this cutoff but have affiliates that meet the $7
million cutoff are still required to provide extensive information for affiliates.
4
To document what has happened within industries in manufacturing
over time, we created a concordance that allows us to assign SIC codes to
NAICS codes. This was necessary because in 1999, the BEA collected
data on NAICS codes and not SIC codes. We chose to convert SIC codes
to NAICS codes since all future information will be collected on the basis
of NAICS codes. For example, data for the benchmark year 2004 will be
available shortly and firms report based on NAICS codes. The 1977 and
1982 benchmark years are based on the 1972 SIC codes. The 1989 and
1994 benchmark years are based on the 1987 SIC codes. The 1999 benchmark data are based on the 1997 NAICS codes. In addition to the fact that
the industry codes are not directly comparable across all benchmark
years, the BEA industry codes have been slightly modified to reflect the
fact that these are enterprise data and are called, respectively, SIC-ISI and
NAICS-ISI. Working with these codes, we created a program (available
on request) that assigns the SIC-ISI codes for the years 1977 to 1994 to
NAICS-ISI codes. Both parents and affiliates are classified into their primary industry of sales using the following algorithm, which tracks the
algorithm used by the BEA: the top five industries by parent or affiliate
sales are used to assign to each parent or affiliate one of the 22 aggregates.
Sales are collapsed into the top five industries of sales, and then the maximum sale by industry is identified. A parent or affiliate is classified as
being in manufacturing if its maximum sales across the top five industries
of sales is in manufacturing.
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industry of sales is manufacturing, since our goal is to
determine whether manufacturing jobs at home are being
replaced by manufacturing jobs abroad. However, some
parents were reclassified from manufacturing to wholesale
trade and services. To account for this, we keep all parents
that were ever classified in manufacturing and their affiliates.5
Table 1 reports the number of manufacturing employees
of U.S. manufacturing parents in both the United States and
foreign affiliate locations. U.S. employment of manufacturing parents declined from nearly 12 million in 1982 to
slightly below 8 million in 1999. The second row of table 1
shows the employment coverage of our sample after we
performed the cleaning procedures described above. The
sample size remains almost the same, particularly in the
later years. Almost all of the increase in foreign affiliate
employment occurred in low-income affiliate locations.
The share of U.S. multinational employment concentrated in affiliates increased from 26% in 1982 to 39% in
1999. Although total affiliate employment increased by
more than 1 million employees, the foreign employment
gains did not fully offset the domestic losses. This suggests
other important determinants of falling domestic employment for U.S. multinationals. Alternative explanations,
which we incorporate into our empirical framework, include
changing prices of capital, labor-saving technical change,
and increased import competition.
Manufacturing multinationals reporting to the BEA
accounted for the majority of economic activity in U.S.
manufacturing during the sample period. Table A1 reports
the coverage of the BEA data for benchmark years 1982
through 1999. In 1982, gross product by these enterprises
accounted for over 80% of total manufacturing and 77% of
manufactured exports in the United States. By 1999, the
BEA’s coverage had declined slightly: these enterprises
accounted for only 63% of U.S. exports and about half of
manufacturing employment. These firms also accounted for
more than 80% of total private U.S. research and development expenditures throughout the sample period (Mataloni
& Fahim-Nader, 1996). Table A1 also shows that the proportion of services that firms accounted for by the BEA
sample is extremely small. During the sample period, the
BEA sample accounted for only between 6% and 8% of
total gross product in services. Consequently, we restrict
our analysis to manufacturing, which we believe provides a
more representative sample.
5
A number of parents have been reclassified from manufacturing to
wholesale trade and services. For example, several firms were in manufacturing but are now classified in wholesale trade because almost all of
their manufacturing is done overseas, not in the United States. To account
for this, we chose our sample in two different ways. First, we included
parents that were either classified in manufacturing or had previously
been classified in manufacturing and their affiliates. Next, we included
only parents that were currently in manufacturing in any given year and
their affiliates. Since the results are not sensitive to this distinction, we
use the larger of the two samples, keeping all parents that were ever classified in manufacturing and all of their affiliates.

How reliable are these data? These are the only data officially collected by a U.S. government agency on affiliate
activity abroad. We have initiated a number of data checks
to analyze the reliability of the coverage.6 We were able to
cross-check the employment numbers for U.S. affiliate
activity reported by the BEA with data on inward foreign
investment reported by the official statistical agencies in
Germany and Sweden. These checks are reported in Table
A2. We report total employment in both countries as indicated by the BEA database and show that it is quite close to
the numbers collected by the national statistical agencies.
Although there are some discrepancies between BEA and
German and Swedish data, this may be at least partially
accounted for by variation in reporting based on fiscal year
versus calendar year. The BEA classifies a firm in 1999 if
its fiscal year ends in 1999—this could be for any month in
1999. Although most firms have their fiscal year ending in
December, enough have earlier end dates that some of the
1999 BEA employment figures correspond to a mix of the
1998 and 1999 employment figures reported by the statistical bureaus for Sweden and Germany.
III.

Empirical Framework

Previous work has used very different econometric models to specify the impact of foreign affiliate activity on labor
demand at home, making it difficult to identify whether the
conflicting results stem from different approaches or different data sets and time periods. Brainard and Riker (1997)
estimate labor demand as a function of wages in different
locations, Desai et al. (2009) estimate a reduced-form equation with growth in log labor at home as a function of log
labor abroad, and Brainard and Riker (2001), Hanson,
Slaughter, and Mataloni (2001), and Muendler and Becker
(2009) use a short-run translog cost function approach to
derive factor shares as a function of wages in different locations. Katz and Murphy (1992) and Card (2001), focusing
on the effects of immigration and trade, both use a CES
functional form to derive an equilibrium relationship
between the ratio of employment at home to employment
abroad and the ratio of wages at home to wages abroad.
We chose to derive labor demand from a generalized cost
function as our primary specification. Our preferred approach is attractive for several reasons. It puts minimal
restrictions on the nature of the production function, unlike
the CES specification, which imposes a constant elasticity
of substitution across different factor inputs. Our approach
is also more flexible than previous approaches in the
6
We are particularly grateful to Marc Muendler and Karolina Eckholm
for helping us do this cross-checking. They provided the data on the activities of U.S. multinational affiliates in Germany and Sweden. We also
contacted Statistics Canada to check whether they record information on
affiliates of U.S. multinationals in Canada, which would allow us to
cross-check U.S. data on foreign affiliates there with Canadian data on
inward foreign investment. Statistics Canada informed us that they do not
gather data on affiliates because it is too difficult to define a foreign affiliate and referred us to the BEA.
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offshoring literature that have imposed a short-run cost
function and kept capital inputs fixed. In the translog
approach, we worry that identifying elasticities of substitution or complementarity and calculating standard errors is a
less transparent process (depending, among other things, on
the choice of factor shares) than estimating a labor demand
equation. However, for completeness, we also derive estimating equations using a generalized translog and CES
function approach. We shall see that the implied elasticities
of complementarity (or substitution) are remarkably robust
across these different specifications.
Modifying Hamermesh (1993), let us consider a firm
using N domestic factors and N* foreign factors of production X1, . . . , XN, X1*, . . . , XN*. We begin by assuming there
are only two locations (domestic and foreign) but will generalize to j locations in the empirical specification that follows. Let the production function for a U.S. multinational
firm i producing total aggregate worldwide output Yi and
using N domestic and N* foreign inputs Xi and Xi* be
Yi ¼ f ðX1i ;    ; XNi ; X1i ;    ; XNi Þ:

ð1Þ

Output Y can include production at home and abroad, and
production could be exported or sold on domestic markets.
Then the associated cost function, based on the demands for
X1 through XN and X1* through XN* is given by
Ci ¼ gðw1i ;    ; wNi ; w1i ;    ; wNi ; Yi Þ;

ð2Þ

where the wi’s and wi*’s are the N and N* input prices at
home and in the foreign affiliate location. One can use Shepard’s lemma to derive the factor demand for the nth input
for U.S. multinational firm i:
d
ðw1i ;    ; wNi ; w1i ;    ; wNi ; Yi Þ;
Xni ¼ Xni

n ¼ 1; . . . ; N; n ¼ 1; . . . ; N  :

ð3Þ

Our first approach will be to estimate a log-linear version
of equation (3), focusing on U.S. labor demand and extending this equation to allow three locations. With three locations, there are three types of labor inputs: home labor, foreign labor in low-income affiliates, and foreign labor in
high-income affiliates. This framework is flexible enough to
allow a range of production technologies, including Brainard and Riker’s (1997) assumption that production is vertically decomposed across high-wage and low-wage regions.
We also allow two other types of inputs, making the total
number of inputs N in each location equal to three: labor,
physical capital, and research and development inputs. As
with wages, we allow physical capital and research and
development inputs to be separately identified depending
on location.
One estimation issue that arises is that global output Y for
firm i is jointly determined with domestic U.S. employment. If we were to estimate equation (3) directly, we
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would have a significant simultaneity problem. We solve
this by assuming that aggregate worldwide output Y for firm
i is a function of domestic and foreign prices:
Yi ¼ YðP; P Þ:
Substituting this into equation (3) yields
d
ðw1i ;    ; wNi ; w1i ;    ; wNi ; P; P Þ;
Xni ¼ Xni

n ¼ 1; . . . ; N; n ¼ 1; . . . ; N  :

ð4Þ

Our first set of estimating equations is based on log-linearization of equation (4), generalizing to j locations, and takes
the following form:
X
X
aj ln Pjt þ
gj wijt
ln Liht ¼ b0 þ
j

þ

X
j

xj rijt þ

X

j

vj tijt þ dt þ fi þ eijt :

ð5Þ

j

The dependent variable lnL is the natural logarithm of net
annual employment by the U.S. parent in the United States,
the P’s are final goods prices, w is the wage in location j
and time t, r is the price of capital in location j and time t,
and t is the price of research and development goods. We
allow for time effects d and a firm-specific (common to the
parent and its affiliate) fixed effect fi, which takes into
account both firm-specific productivity differences and
other nonvarying firm characteristics, while j indexes location and t indexes time.
A. Identifying the Motives for Offshoring

Markusen and Maskus (2001), in their comprehensive
survey of general equilibrium approaches to the multinational firm, define horizontal multinationals as ‘‘firms that
produce the same product in multiple plants, serving local
markets by local production.’’ This definition of horizontal
integration implies that intrafirm trade will be low, since
foreign investment substitutes for U.S. exports. Vertical
firms are defined as ‘‘firms that fragment the production
process into stages based on factor intensities and locate
activities according to international differences in factor
prices.’’ An important finding of Markusen and Maskus is
that foreign investment replaces trade in the case of horizontal multinationals but is positively correlated with trade
in the case of vertical foreign investment. Although we cannot directly test the motivation for foreign investment with
our data, our data set is rich enough that we can construct
credible proxies to help us distinguish between different
motives for offshoring.
Conceptually, there is a clear distinction between horizontal FDI (H-FDI) and vertical FDI (V-FDI). In practice
though, firms often do both simultaneously. And within the
class of V-FDI, there is a range of activities, including
resales FDI and export platform FDI. To get at these
nuances empirically, we compute a variety of measures of
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TABLE 2.—DEFINING HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
Measures of Vertical Integration as Share of Parent Sales: Coefficient Estimates from Regession of Measure
of Vertical Integration on Industry Dummies

Industry (97 NAICS code)
Textiles and Apparel
Food
Beverages and Tobacco
Leather Products
Wood Products
Paper
Chemicals
Plastics and Rubber
Nonmetallic Minerals
Primary Metals
Fabricated Metals
Machinery
Computer and Electronics
Electrical Equipment
Transportation Equipment
Toys, Dolls & Miscellaneous
Constant
Number of observations
R2

Imports from
Foreign
Affiliates

Exports for
Further
Processing

Exports
for Resale

Share Affiliate
Production
Exported

0.007**
0.005
0.018**
0.002
0.041**
0.004
0.009**
0.001
0.009**
0.009**
0.005
0.015**
0.034**
0.013**
0.019**
0.015**
0.009**
4,338
0.049

0.006
0.006
0.011**
0.014**
0.005
0.006
0.029**
0.012**
0.000
0.004
0.009**
0.035**
0.097**
0.017**
0.011**
0.042**
0.022**
4,338
0.189

0.019
0.021
0.021
0.001
0.019
0.021
0.005
0.017
0.021
0.018
0.007
0.000
0.027
0.007
0.016
0.001
0.019**
4,338
0.025

0.321**
0.044
0.195**
0.152
0.149**
0.144**
0.071**
0.066*
0.198**
0.134**
0.061*
0.111**
0.131**
0.031
0.122**
0.076**
0.265**
4,338
0.027

The constant term is the mean for Petroleum and Coal since it is the omitted industry. **Indicates that the within-industry mean is statistically significantly different from the constant term at the 1% level. For a
detailed description of which industries are included in Miscellaneous, see http://www.census.gov/eped/naics/NAICS33C.HTM#N339.

vertical integration at the firm level and interact these firmlevel measures of vertical integration with our wage variables in our estimating equations. The firm-specific measures of vertical integration are calculated as the mean of
the measure of vertical integration over the entire sample
period so as to avoid the endogeneity problem associated
with including measures of intrafirm trade as explanatory
variables. The alternatives to defining vertical integration at
the firm level are to define vertical integration as the beginning-of-period level or to define it at the industry level.
Both of these approaches have significant drawbacks. The
first ignores changes over time in vertical integration, and
the second masks significant within-sector firm heterogeneity. Thus, our preferred measure is the firm-level measure
of vertical integration.
To get a sense for what determines the various types of
vertical integration, we regress each of our measures of vertical integration on a set of industry dummies clustering the
standard errors at the industry level. Table 2 presents the
coefficient estimates from this regression. Petroleum and
Coal Products is the omitted industry so that the constant
term is the mean of the dependent variable for firms in the
Petroleum and Coal Products industry. All of the other coefficients should be interpreted relative to the constant term.
For example, over the entire sample period, the mean of
imports from foreign affiliates as a share of parent sales in
Textiles and Apparel is 0.009 plus 0.007 or 0.016 and is significantly greater than the mean for Petroleum and Coal Products at the 99% level. Each column represents a different
measure of vertical integration: the dependent variable in
column 1 is total imports from foreign affiliates, the depen-

dent variable in column 2 is exports to foreign affiliates for
further processing, the dependent variable in column 3 is
exports to affiliates for resale, and the dependent variable in
column 4 is the share of affiliate production that is exported.
Only one industry stands out as notable for the share of
affiliate production exported: textiles and apparel. In textiles and apparel, the mean share of affiliate production
exported is 58.6%. This is reassuring in that it is consistent
with what we know about the textile and apparel industry.
We omit the results for total exports to foreign affiliates
because they closely resemble the results in column 2, indicating that the cross-industry variation in exports to foreign
affiliates is driven by the variation in exports for further
processing. Exports for resale vary little across industries.
Like Hanson, Mataloni, and Slaughter (2005), our preferred measure of the type of vertical integration characterized by a fragmentation of the production process across
various locations in response to factor cost differences is
exports for further processing. Unfortunately, the BEA does
not record information on whether imports from foreign
affiliates are final goods imports or imports of intermediate
goods, making it difficult to interpret these numbers. Nevertheless, we report both sets of statistics for the sake of completeness. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2007) also use
intrafirm trade to quantify the increase in vertical activities
of multinationals, pointing out that intrafirm trade ‘‘mostly
reflects the international division of labor within multinational enterprises.’’ By this measure of vertical integration,
the computer and electronics industry clearly stands out as
the most vertically integrated industry with exports to affiliates for further processing at roughly 12% of sales.
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Finally, much horizontal FDI is motivated by trade barriers (such as tariffs or quotas). Textiles and apparel and
beverages and tobacco are typically the most protected sectors in both industrial and developing countries. Evidence
to support this for developing countries can be found in
Harrison and Hanson (1999). Tariffs in the United States
are currently at very low levels. However, prior to trade liberalization (1979, for example), trade frictions for the United States followed the same pattern. They were highest for
textiles and apparel, beverages and tobacco, leather, and
nonmetallic minerals (cement). These patterns imply that
firms in highly protected sectors (textiles and apparel) or in
sectors with high costs of transportation (cement) must frequently engage in horizontal investments in order to access
domestic foreign markets.
B. Data and Estimation Issues

To estimate equation (5), we need data on U.S. employment, capital prices, wages, final goods prices, and research
and development prices. We also need factor prices and
output prices for each of the j locations in which the multinational firm has operations. We measure U.S. employment
as the (log) number of individuals employed by the parent
in the United States, since hours or even employment broken down by skill levels are not collected for U.S. parents.
Domestic prices of investment are defined at the disaggregated industry level and are taken from the NBER’s manufacturing database. Domestic U.S. wages are computed at
the industry level using both the BEA and UNIDO data sets
(see the discussion below). And finally, domestic final goods
prices are captured by the log of industry sales deflated by
the producer price index.
While in principle there could be as many factor and final
goods prices as there are countries in the BEA database, in
practice the number of j locations is limited by data availability and the need for parsimony in estimation. We restrict
our j locations to three: domestic (U.S.) activity, highincome locations, and low-income locations. One problem
is that many firms, especially small enterprises, do not have
any operations in low-income countries. To permit us to
include these firms in the estimation, we set wages for these
firms equal to 0 and add a dummy variable indicating
whether the firm has a missing observation for low-income
affiliates.
Our proxy for final goods prices abroad is the log of
affiliate sales deflated by the foreign price index. Our measure of foreign investment prices comes from the Penn
World Tables. While in principle all foreign factor prices
should be broken down into low-income foreign and highincome foreign affiliate locations, collinearity in investment
and consumption prices has led us to aggregate these prices
across foreign affiliate locations. Because both capital and
goods are significantly more mobile than individuals, the
factor price differentials across high- and low-income affiliate locations are much larger for labor inputs.
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To control for exposure to international competition, we
use data on import penetration made available at the fourdigit ISIC level by Bernard et al. (2006). We also include a
measure of import penetration from low-wage countries,
also computed by these authors. These measures of import
competition include imports of final goods as well as
imported intermediate inputs. To the best of our knowledge,
no time-series data are available for the period 1982 to
1999 that separately identify final goods imports from
imported intermediate inputs. However, even if there were,
existing evidence suggests that it would be very difficult to
disentangle the two effects. This is because the aggregate
trends over time in the two series are highly correlated both
over time and across industries. (See figures 4 and 5 of
Ebenstein, et al., 2009, for the time-series correlation.) Our
own calculations show that for the period 1997 to 2005, the
correlation in the two measures across industries is 0.85.
We do not have adequate measures of prices for research
and development goods. However, we believe that these are
important inputs into production and could account for a
significant impact on manufacturing employment, particularly if research and development inputs are associated with
labor-saving technical change. Consequently, we proxy for
prices of research and development goods with research
and development spending as a share of parent sales.
Though there are other ways to measure R&D (for example,
R&D spending per R&D employee by country), none are
well suited to our analysis because they severely limit sample size.
Since wages are calculated at the country level using
BEA aggregates of the firm-level measures, we assume that
wages are exogenously determined. However, we also test
for the validity of this assumption by using wages collected
by UNIDO. Following Hanson et al. (2005), wages are
employment-weighted averages of wages in high- and lowincome affiliates, where the weights are given by the competitor’s share of employment within countries belonging to
each high- and low-income category. We use competitor’s
wages to avoid the endogeneity problems associated with
using the parent’s own employment choices. Affiliate country locations are defined as either high or low income based
on the World Bank’s country classifications (see table A8).
IV.

Results

We report sample means in table 3. Consistent with the
trends in table 1, parent employment fell over the sample
period by 20%. Real wages in the sample went up in the
United States by 11.6% and in high-income affiliate locations by 22.9% but fell by 21.5% in low-income affiliate
locations. Table A8 shows that the annual average changes
in wages and employment in the manufacturing sector
reported by UNIDO are similar to what we find using the
BEA data. Apart from East Asia, the numbers in table A4
show real wage declines in low-income countries of
between 1% and 2% per year and employment gains of
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TABLE 3.—SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable
Log U.S. Employment
Log U.S. Manufacturing Wages, BEA
Log High-Income Affiliate Wages
Log Low-Income Affiliate Wages
Log U.S. Price of Investment, NBER Manufacturing Database
Log Foreign Price of Investment, Penn World Tables (PWT)
U.S R&D Expenditure (% Sales)
High-Income Affiliate R&D Expenditure (% Sales)
Low-Income Affiliate R&D Expenditure (% Sales)
Import Penetration, Bernard et al. (2006)
Import Penetration from Low-Income Countries, Bernard et al. (2006)
Log Parent Sales by Industry
Log Affiliate Sales by Industry
Imports from Foreign Affiliates (% Sales)
Exports for Foreign Affiliates (% Sales)
Exports for Further Processing (% Sales)
Exports for Resale (% Sales)
Share of Affiliate Production Exported

between 2% and 9% per year over the sample period. Similar to the BEA numbers, the UNIDO statistics for highincome countries show average real wage increases of .41%
per year and average employment declines of .68% per
year.
Research and development expenditure as a share of parent sales averaged 3.7% for U.S. parents, .6% for affiliates
in high-income countries, and .1% for affiliates in lowincome countries. R&D spending as a share of sales rose
significantly in the United States and in high-income affiliate locations but changed very little in low-income affiliate
locations.
Average import penetration in the four-digit SIC sector
over the period was 17.4% and increased by 12.1 percentage points over the sample period. Average import penetration from low-wage countries increased by 5.9 percentage
points over the sample period. The real price of investment
fell by 27.9 percentage points over the period in the United
States and 9.9 percentage points abroad. These price
declines reflect in part the importance of falling computerrelated costs for these firms. Industry sales in the United
State increased by 10.9% in the United States and by 31.4%
abroad, reflecting the growing importance of overseas markets for U.S. multinationals.
A. Fixed Effect Results for Labor Demand

We report the results of estimating equation (5) in table
4. The log of U.S. employment is our dependent variable,
and we use a within transformation of the data to eliminate
firm fixed effects. All specifications include time dummies
to control for year-specific shocks. Column 1 of table 4
reports coefficient estimates without controlling for the
motives for offshoring. In each of columns 2 through 5, we
interact different measures of vertical integration with our
wage variables to test whether the motive for offshoring

No. of
Observations

Mean

Standard
Deviation

Change in Mean,
1982–1999

3,946
3,946
3,946
3,946
3,946
3,946
3,946
3,946
3,946
3,946
3,946
3,946
3,946
3,946
3,946
3,946
3,946
3,946

7.558
3.331
3.158
2.044
0.698
0.629
0.037
0.006
0.001
0.174
0.059
12.286
9.363
0.027
0.051
0.031
0.021
0.366

1.673
0.398
0.487
0.794
0.067
0.318
0.052
0.018
0.004
0.118
0.065
0.923
0.557
0.069
0.158
0.111
0.105
0.331

0.204
0.116
0.229
0.215
0.276
0.099
0.011
0.004
0.000
0.121
0.059
0.109
0.314
0.021
0.023
0.022
0.006
0.005

affects the impact of offshoring on domestic employment.
Our measures of vertical integration between parents and
affiliates are imports from foreign affiliates (column 2),
exports to affiliates for further processing (column 3a),
exports to foreign affiliates for further processing by destination (column 3b), exports to foreign affiliates for resale
(column 4) and affiliate exports as a share of affiliate sales
(column 5).
The results in column 1 indicate that employees in lowincome affiliates are substitutes for U.S. employees. The
point estimate of 0.097 on low-income affiliate wages indicates that a 1% fall in foreign wages would lead to a
0.097% fall in U.S. parent employment. The point estimate
on high-income affiliate wages suggests the opposite: a 1%
fall in high-income affiliate wage increases would be associated with a 0.006% increase in parent employment. However, the point estimate on wages in high-income countries
is statistically insignificant. In columns 2 through 5, we
allow the slope coefficients on our foreign wage variables
to vary according to degrees of vertical integration as
defined in table 2.
The coefficients on the interaction terms differ substantially depending on the definition of vertical integration. In
columns 2, 4, and 5, the coefficients on the interaction terms
are not significant. Thus, differentiating parents on the basis
of total imports from foreign affiliates, exports for resale as
a share of sales or the share of affiliate production exported
provides no additional information regarding the degree of
substitutability between domestic and foreign labor. By
contrast, the results in columns 3a and 3b indicate that
exports for further processing play an important role in
determining margins of multinational labor substitution.
The point estimate on low-income affiliate wages interacted
with exports for further processing equals 3.127 and
jumps to 3.915 when low-income affiliate wages are interacted with exports for further processing to low-income
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TABLE 4.—WITHIN ESTIMATES OF LABOR DEMAND: U.S. PARENTS

Log U.S. Industrial Wages
Log Industrial Wages High-Income Countries
Log Industrial Wages Low-Income Countries
Log Industrial Wages High-Income
Countries  Vertical
Log Industrial Wages Low Income
Countries  Vertical
Log of the U.S. Price of Capital
Log of the Foreign Price of Capital
Import Penetration
Import Penetration from Low-Wage Countries
R&D (% Sales)
R&D (% Sales) in High-Income Countries
R&D (% Sales) in Low-Income Countries
Log of Industry Sales
Log Affiliate Sales by Industry
Time dummy 1989
Time dummy 1994
Time dummy 1999
Observations
R2

(1)

(2)

(3a)

(3b)

(4)

(5)

Pooled

Imports from
Affiliates

Exports for
Processing

Exports for
Processing

Exports for
Resale

Export
Platform FDI

0.332
[0.045]**
0.015
[0.038]
0.097
[0.018]**
0.316
[0.544]
0.004
[0.392]
0.393
[0.175]**
0.190
[0.071]**
0.232
[0.096]**
0.094
[0.339]
0.846
[0.447]*
1.529
[0.695]*
5.046
[2.418]*
0.154
[0.029]**
0.049
[0.041]
0.029
[0.043]
0.026
[0.060]
0.075
[0.078]
3,946
0.09

0.401
[0.047]**
0.036
[0.041]
0.126
[0.019]**
1.185
[0.788]
3.127
[0.945]**
0.389
[0.175]**
0.172
[0.071]*
0.232
[0.095]**
0.112
[0.337]
0.896
[0.447]*
1.453
[0.693]*
4.795
[2.406]*
0.152
[0.029]**
0.053
[0.041]
0.034
[0.043]
0.032
[0.060]
0.068
[0.078]
3,946
0.09

0.350
[0.041]**
0.048
[0.049]
0.104
[0.017]**
1.741
[0.876]**
3.915
[0.744]**
0.589
[0.195]**
0.162
[0.061]*
0.192
[0.077]**
0.181
[0.488]
0.737
[0.311]*
1.449
[0.599]*
4.949
[2.427]*
0.142
[0.029]**
0.033
[0.041]
0.055
[0.044]
0.009
[0.061]
0.115
[0.079]
3,946
0.09

0.386
[0.045]**
0.026
[0.038]
0.098
[0.018]**
1.803
[0.806]**
0.043
[0.272]
0.330
[0.184]**
0.185
[0.071]**
0.237
[0.096]**
0.053
[0.339]
0.791
[0.448]*
1.488
[0.694]*
4.957
[2.413]*
0.153
[0.029]**
0.050
[0.041]
0.033
[0.043]
0.034
[0.060]
0.064
[0.079]
3,946
0.09

0.466
[0.114]**
0.051
[0.086]
0.057
[0.046]
0.098
[0.128]
0.064
[0.069]
0.398
[0.175]**
0.193
[0.071]**
0.232
[0.096]**
0.076
[0.339]
0.843
[0.448]*
1.558
[0.695]*
4.956
[2.414]*
0.153
[0.029]**
0.049
[0.041]
0.028
[0.043]
0.024
[0.060]
0.079
[0.078]
3,946
0.09

0.359
[0.042]**
0.006
[0.035]
0.097
[0.016]**

0.403
[0.175]**
0.187
[0.071]**
0.232
[0.096]**
0.081
[0.338]
0.834
[0.447]*
1.516
[0.695]*
4.985
[2.413]*
0.153
[0.029]**
0.051
[0.041]
0.028
[0.043]
0.024
[0.060]
0.080
[0.078]
3,946
0.09

Standard errors corrected for arbitrary heterskedasticity are in brackets. *Significant at 5%, **Significant at 1%. Each of columns 2–5 includes an interaction term between the wage measures and vertical integration defined at the firm level as the mean of the variable in the column heading over the entire sample period. In column 3b, exports for further processing are broken down by location: exports to high-income countries are interacted with Wages in high-income countries, and exports to low-income countries are interacted with low-income country wages.

countries. These point estimates imply that for parents that
export significant amounts of goods to low-income countries for further processing, domestic and foreign labor are
complements. The point estimate on high-income affiliate
wages interacted with exports for further processing is
1.185 but statistically insignificant in column 3a, but
increases to 1.741 and becomes significant when interacted
with exports for further processing to high-income countries. The implication of this last result is that workers in
high-income affiliates substitute for U.S. workers in companies that export significant amounts of goods to highincome countries for further processing.
The own-wage elasticity, which varies between 0.33
and 0.47 across columns 1 through 5, suggests that a 1%
increase in the domestic U.S. manufacturing wage reduces
labor demand by 0.33% to 0.47%. The magnitude is in line
with the dozens of studies cited in Hamermesh (1993), who
reports that most studies find that the own-wage elasticity
for labor lies between 0.3 and 0.7. The coefficient on the

industry-specific home price of investment is positive
across all specifications, indicating that reductions in the
price of domestic investment goods reduce domestic labor
demand. The coefficient on investment abroad is similarly
positive. These coefficient estimates imply that capital and
labor are generally substitutes. This is consistent with a
story in which less skilled workers are being replaced by
capital (computers) and consistent with previous labor
demand studies on capital-labor substitution cited in
Hamermesh (1993).
Negative employment effects are also associated with
increases in import penetration (arm’s-length trade). The
point estimates range from 0.192 to 0.237 across specifications, indicating that a 1 percentage point increase in
import penetration during the sample period would imply a
decline in U.S. manufacturing employment of 0.192 to
0.237 percentage points.
Positive employment effects are associated with our
proxies for the prices of technology inputs, the share of
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research and development expenditure in parent sales. The
results indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in the parent research and development expenditure shares would be
associated with employment increases between 0.737 and
0.896 percentage points. For affiliates in high-income locations, a 1 percentage point increase in the affiliate research
and development share is associated with employment
increases between 1.449 and 1.558 percentage points. For
affiliates in low-income locations, a 1 percentage point
increase in the affiliate research and development share is
associated with employment increases between 4.795 and
5.046 percentage points. In spite of the very large point estimates on affiliate research and development expenditure
shares, the changes in means in table 4 make it clear that
R&D activities in affiliates have not had an economically
significant impact on U.S. parent employment.
Positive employment effects are also associated with our
proxies for final goods prices in the United States, the log
of the real value of industry sales. The results indicate that
a 1 percentage point increase in final goods prices would be
associated with employment increases between 0.142 and
0.152 percentage points. Negative but statistically and economically insignificant employment effects are associated
with increases in final goods prices abroad: a 1 percentage
point increase in our proxy for final goods prices abroad is
associated with employment declines of between 0.033
and 0.053 percentage points.
The net effect of vertical integration as measured by
exports for further processing is equal to the coefficient on
low- (high-) income affiliate wages plus the coefficient on
the interaction between low- (high-) income affiliate wages
multiplied by the value of vertical integration at different
points in the distribution. The net effect of offshoring to
low-wage countries is nonmonotonic and turns positive
only for the last two quartiles of the distribution. Thus, the
employment effects of offshoring to low-wage countries are
positive only for firms that export significant amounts of
goods to low-wage countries for further processing. Column 2 of table 2 shows that, on average, these firms are
most likely to be in the computers and electronics industry.
The opposite signs on the interaction between wages and
exports for further processing imply that employees of
affiliates in high- and low-income countries must be performing different tasks. To check this, we use information
on employee type for the computer and electronics industry
for the four countries that received more than 80% of the
share of exports for further processing in 1999: Canada,
Mexico, China, and Brazil. Unlike parent employment,
affiliate employment is recorded for the following categories: production workers, nonproduction workers, and
research and development employees. Using this information, we computed for each country the share of production
employees, nonproduction employees and research and
development employees. The results in table 5 show that
roughly two-thirds of all employees in the developing countries are production employees. By contrast, only around a

TABLE 5.—COMPOSITION OF EMPLOYMENT IN THE COMPUTER INDUSTRY,
BY COUNTRY, 1999

Production employees
Nonproduction employees
R&D employees
Total

Canada

Mexico

China

Brazil

39.10%
57.20
3.70
100.00%

65.70%
33.60
0.70
100.00%

62.60%
36.50
0.90
100.00%

66.66%
33.05
0.29
100.00%

third of the workforce in Canada is made up of production
employees. Though we do not have the data to prove it
directly, these results strongly suggest that employees in the
computer and electronics industry in Canada perform tasks
that are more similar to those of U.S. employees, while
employees in Mexico, Brazil, and China perform tasks that
are significantly different from the tasks that U.S. workers
perform.
The critical parameters of interest in table 4 are the coefficients on affiliate wages and affiliate wages interacted
with our measures of vertical integration, which indicate
whether affiliate employment substitutes for or is complementary with home employment. In column 2 of table 6,
we report results using an alternative definition of affiliate
wages. Instead of constructing country-level wages from the
BEA sample, we use country wages reported by UNIDO.
Wages are calculated based on surveys administered by
UNIDO, supplemented with secondary sources (such as
national statistical agencies) gathered by UNIDO as well.
Wages are calculated as compensation divided by number of
employees, collected at the three-digit ISIC level (Revision
2). All values are converted to U.S. dollars using the IMF
exchange rate series RF. As in table 4, we weight countrylevel wages using the parent’s initial distribution of employment across affiliate locations when the parent first appears
in the sample.
The results in table 6 are consistent with our earlier
results, suggesting that the source for country-level wages
does not affect our coefficient estimates. The coefficients
on high- and low-income affiliate wages are the same sign
and close in magnitude to the previous results. As before,
the results indicate that offshoring to low-wage countries
generally depresses home employment except for parents
that export a significant amount of goods for further processing to low-wage countries. Negative employment effects
are associated with offshoring to high-wage countries, and
the magnitude of the effect is a function of the share of
exports sent to high-wage countries for further processing.
B. Attrition Bias

We face potentially important selection problems.
Between each benchmark year, roughly 20% of the parents
drop out of our sample and do not reappear. If some of
these firms relocate all operations abroad and close down
their U.S. operations, then our estimates of the employment
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TABLE 6.—IMPLIED ELASTICITY OF LABOR DEMAND ACROSS ALTERNATIVE SPECIFICATIONS

Implied Elasticity of Labor Demand gij
(% Change in Li in Response
to % Change in wj)

(1)

(2)

Basic
Specification
(table 5)

Replacing BEA
Wages with
UNIDO wages

Coefficient estimates without controls for degree of vertical integration
Parent wages
0.359
0.287
High-income affiliate wages
0.006
0.001
Low-income affiliate wages
0.097
0.102
Coefficient estimates controlling for degree of vertical integration (exports for further processing)
Parent wages
0.351
0.299
High-income affiliate wages
0.048
0.003
Low-income affiliate wages
0.104
0.122
High-income Affiliate Wages  Vertical
1.741
1.666
Low-income Affiliate Wages  Vertical
3.915
4.103

(3)

(4)

CES
Specification

Translog
Cost
Function

–
0.007
0.081

0.225
0.003
0.112

–
0.007
0.091
1.765
3.221

0.313
0.004
0.132
1.701
4.245

Coefficients taken from column 3b of table 4 and unreported coefficients for robustness checks including replacing BEA wages with UNIDO wages and using estimating equations based on CES and translog functional forms. Factor shares used to compute elasticities taken from sample means. All coefficients are significant at the 95% level, and standard errors for CES and translog coefficient estimates are bootstrapped.

costs of multinational activity could be downward biased.
Following Wooldridge (2002), we test for survivorship bias
by including a lead of the selection indicator si, tþ1 in our
estimating equations, where si,tþ1 is equal to 0 for firms that
do not exit the sample and switches from 0 to 1 in the period just before attrition. The coefficient on the lead of the
selection indicator was negative and significant for both
vertically and horizontally integrated firms. The significant
and negative sign on the selection variable is a possible
indicator that firms that exit the sample are those most
likely to contract employment. To address this potential criticism, we correct for selection bias using two approaches:
a Heckman-type selection correction and inverse probability weighting.
Following Wooldridge (2002) our first approach, a Heckman-type correction, models this selection problem as follows. If our equation of interest is given by
yit ¼ xit b þ uit ; t ¼ 2; . . . ; T;
then conditional on the parent reporting in the previous period, si,t-1 ¼ 1, we can write a reduced-form selection equation for t  2 as
sit ¼ 1½wit dt þ vit > 0;


where; vit j xit ; wit ; si;t1 ¼ 1  Normalð0; 1Þ:
In the context of panel data with an unobserved firm fixed
effect and attrition, Wooldridge (2002) proposes as a solution a variant of a two-stage Heckman correction. In each
period, Wooldridge proposes estimating a selection equation using a probit approach and calculating lambda, the
inverse Mills ratio, for each parent i. Once a series of lambdas has been estimated for each year and parent, the estimating equations are augmented by these lambdas.
This approach is successful only if we can identify determinants of the binary selection variable sit before the firm
exits the sample (in period t  1) that do not belong in the
estimating equation. We identified candidate variables

using the insights derived from a class of models indicating
that heterogeneity in productivity is a significant determinant of whether firms enter into international trade or foreign investment (see Melitz, 2003). These models suggest
that only the most profitable firms are likely to engage in
trade or foreign investment. Since we already control for
output and factor price shocks using a variety of input and
output prices, parent profitability in the previous period
does not belong in the estimating equations (indeed, auxiliary regressions show that lagged profits from the benchmark surveys five years earlier do not predict current period
employment). Consequently, we use as the excluded determinant of survival the parent’s profitability in the previous
period.
Table A5 reports the second-stage estimates using this
two-step approach. The sample size decreases significantly,
since implementing the selection correction eliminates the
first time-series observation for each parent. The coefficients on the inverse Mills ratios are statistically insignificant across all specifications, indicating that selection is not
biasing our results. Additionally, adding the inverse Mills
ratio to control for selection does not change the sign and
barely changes the point estimates on the coefficients of
interest. The coefficients on affiliate wages in low-income
countries remain positive and and statistically significant
across all specifications. The coefficient on the interaction
between high-income affiliate wages and exports for further
processing to high income countries is positive and significant, while the coefficient on the interaction between lowincome affiliate wages and exports for further processing to
low-wage countries changes sign depending on the degree
of vertical integration.
We also explored using inverse probability weighting as
outlined in Wooldridge (2002) to correct for selection bias.
This approach consists of the following two-step procedure.
In each time period, we estimate a binary response model
for the probability of survival for the group in the sample at
time t  1. Using the fitted probabilities from the first step,
we obtain the following weights:
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TABLE 7.—CALCULATING THE IMPACT OF DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF GLOBALIZATION ON PARENT LABOR DEMAND

Factors Affecting U.S. Labor Demand
Log U.S. Industrial Wages
Log Industrial Wages in High-Income Countries
Log Industrial Wages in Low-Income Countries
Log of U.S. Price of Capital
Log of Foreign Price of Capital
Import Penetration
Import Penetration from Low-Wage Countries
R&D Spending (% Sales)
R&D Spending in High-Income Countries (% Sales)
R&D Spending in Low-Income Countries (% Sales)
Log of Industry Sales
Log of Affiliate Sales by Industry
Log Industrial Wages in Low-Income Countries 
Exports for Further Processing
Log Industrial Wages in High-Income Countries 
Exports for Further Processing
Net Impact of All Above Variables

Impact of
1% Increase
in Factor

Actual
Increase
in Sample

Percentage
Change in
Labor Demand

Keeping Only
Significant
Coefficients

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

0.351
0.048
0.104
0.439
0.162
0.192
0.181
0.737
1.449
4.949
0.142
0.033
3.127

0.116
0.229
0.229
0.276
0.099
0.121
0.059
0.011
0.004
0.0001
0.109
0.314
0.008

4.072
1.099
2.382
12.116
1.604
2.323
1.068
0.811
0.580
0.049
1.548
1.036
2.502

4.072

1.741

0.005

2.382
12.116
1.604
2.323
0.811
0.580
0.049
1.548
2.502

0.871

0.871

17.204

16.137

Coefficients in columns 1 are taken from column (3b) of table 4. Numbers in column 2 are taken from means table 4. Numbers in column 3 are calculated by multiplying by 100  column 1  column 2. Column 4
is calculated the same way as column 3, but only the coefficients that were significant in table 4 are reported. The final row net impact sums up all the previous effects.

^it  p
^i;t1 . . . p
^I;1 ;
p^it ¼ p
where hats denote fitted probabilities. This methodology
allowed us to choose covariates in the probits that are
essentially everything we can observe for units in the sample at time t  1 that might affect attrition. In our case, we
included all of the regressors in our original model plus firm
size, firm profitability, and the firm’s share of employment
in low-income countries. Using this approach also did not
affect our estimates, and consequently we do not report them
here.
In both cases, the first-stage results indicate that expansion into low-wage countries is positively correlated with
the probability of firm survival. Thus, we find some evidence that the jobs lost as a result of offshoring might have
been lost anyway. However, controlling for this possibility
does not change the sign or magnitude of our wage elasticities in table 4.
C. Extensive and Intensive Margin

All of the results we presented examine activity at the
intensive margin. As Muendler and Becker (2009) noted,
expansion (contraction) of employment at existing affiliates—the intensive margin—may have different employment effects from opening (closing) new operations—the
extensive margin. In what follows, we show that the vast
majority of affiliate employment expansions and contractions take place at the extensive margin. Even in China
where most of the employment expansion took place
between 1994 and 1999, the activity took place at the intensive margin. Although there was significant entry into

China between 1982 and 1989, these affiliates had very few
employees (11,000 in total) when they were established.
Thus, this activity at the extensive margin in China between
1982 and 1989 could not have had much of an impact on
parent employment between 1982 and 1989.
Before proceeding, we note an important data limitation.
Parents can report affiliate activity on an aggregated basis
or file separate reports for each affiliate. Because there is no
way to distinguish this in the data, the only certain information is whether a parent is present in a particular country in
a given time period. Therefore, the BEA statistics on affiliate activity could mask some underlying opening and closing of specific plants by the same parent.7
Table A6 shows entry and exit to and from low-wage
countries where activity at the extensive margin is most
likely to be an issue because of extensive deregulation in
these countries over the sample period. The numbers represent counts of parents with affiliates in low-income countries, and the percentages indicate the percentage of affiliate
employment in low-income countries accounted for by
those affiliates. Each of the three panels shows activity
between two consecutive years: 1982–1989, 1989–1994,
and 1994–1999. For example, the top panel shows that
between 1982 and 1989, thirty parents entered developing
country markets for the first time. These thirty parents
accounted for only 4.39% of the total employment expansion in low income affiliates. Table A7 shows that affiliate
employment in low-income countries increased by around
353,978 between 1982 and 1989. Of this expansion, only
7
We take care of this in the data analysis by aggregating information
for affiliates of parents in the same country year, thus making all of the
affiliate data comparable.
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15,539 jobs were a result of activity at the extensive margin. The magnitudes of activity at the extensive margin are
even smaller for the periods 1989 to 1994 and 1994 to
1999.
Since Mexico accounts for more than a third of all affiliate employment in low-income countries, we repeat this
exercise for Mexico in Table A6. Once again, the magnitudes of employment expansion and contraction at the
extensive margin are small. Between 1982 and 1989, affiliate employment in Mexico increased by 288,012. Of this
increase, only 10% or 28,012 jobs, were created at the
extensive margin. Between 1994 and 1999, when the effects
of NAFTA would be prominent, 87% of affiliate activity
took place at the intensive margin, while only 6% of affiliate activity (or 9,180 jobs) took place at the extensive
margin.
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LSHAREijt ¼ b0 þ
þ

X
j

X

qj ln Yijt þ

j

nj ln wijt þ

X

X

jj ln tijt

j

#j ln rijt þ fi þ eijt ;

ð6Þ

j

where LSHARE is defined as the cost share of labor expenditures in location j for parent i in time t, relative to expenditures on labor and capital across all locations. We impose
the restrictions implied by the framework; in particular, it
must be the case that the coefficients on factor prices sum
to 0.
For completeness, we also consider aggregating capital
and labor across locations using a CES function (Katz &
Murphy, 1992, and Card, 2001, use this approach). Thus,
we define L as
r
"
#r1
X
r1
ðeij Nij Þ r
;
ð7Þ
Li ¼
j

D. Alternative Specifications: Translog and CES
Specifications

We also test for the robustness of our results to two alternatives: a framework based on a translog cost function and
a framework based on CES production functions. The translog approach has been adopted by Brainard and Riker
(2001), Hanson et al. (2001), and Muendler and Becker
(2009). This alternative approach has the advantage that the
translog cost function approximates many well-behaved
cost functions. The translog total variable cost (TC) function (omitting time and parent subscripts) for wages W,
investment prices r, research and development input prices
t and output Y is given by
ln TC ¼ a0 þ

X

-j ln Y þ

j

X

ajw ln W þ

j

X

mj ln r

j

1XX
ajA ln t þ
ajY ðln Y Þ2
þ
2
j
j
k
1XX
1XX
þ
njk ðln W Þ2 þ
b ðln tÞ2
2 j k
2 j k jk
XX
1XX
þ
xjk ðln r Þ2 þ
#jk ln W ln r ð5Þ
2 j k
j
k
XX
XX
sjk ln Y ln t þ
qjk ln Y ln W
þ
X

j

þ
þ

j

k

XX
j

k

j

k

XX

vjk ln r ln t þ

Equations (8a) and (8b) underscore the fact that as long as
there is some substitution (or complementarity) between
domestic and foreign labor, the cost of labor abroad plays an
important role in determining the demand for U.S. labor. In
addition, one of the restrictions of the CES specification is
that the Allen elasticity of substitution between parent and
low-income affiliates should be the same as the elasticity of
substitution between parent and high-income affiliates.
E. Comparing Elasticities of Labor Demand across
Specifications

k

XX
j

where e represents productivity shocks, Li is the total quantity of labor used, and r is the Allen elasticity of substitution between labor in location i and j and is defined below.8
Manipulation of the first-order conditions for profit maximization yields the following estimating equations:
ph
eh
þ ðr  1Þ ln
ln ðLh =Lhif Þ ¼ r ln
phif
ehif
ð8aÞ
wh
 r ln
;
whif
ph
eh
ln ðLh =Llif Þ ¼ r ln
þ ðr  1Þ ln
plif
elif
ð8bÞ
wh
 r ln
:
wlif

ujk ln r ln Y

k

jjk ln t ln W þ e:

Differentiating ln TC with respect to ln Wj according to
Shepard’s lemma and allowing for a firm fixed effect yields
labor’s share in total costs in location j for parent i at time t:

All three approaches yield coefficient estimates that can
be used to derive elasticities of factor demand g and Allen
8
If sigma is equal to 0, we have the case of perfect complements (that
is, left shoes and right shoes, The leontief function that looks like L ¼
min(Lh, Lf). This is obviously extreme but might be applicable to some
kinds of natural resource extraction. The polar opposite is r tending to
infinity (labor at home and labor abroad are perfect substitutes so L¼Lh þ
Lf). This is also extreme, but some version of this might be realistic for
production workers.

870

THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS

elasticities of substitution r. In equation (5), the key parameters are the elasticities of factor demand g. Typically
inputs i and j are referred to as p-complements if gij is less
than 0 and p-substitutes if gij is greater than 0. The key
parameters in equation (6) are the nj’s. To convert these into
Allen partial elasticities of substitution between locations,
we can calculate the following based on observed labor
shares sj:
rjk ¼ ðnjk þ sj sk Þ=sj sk and rjj ¼ ðnjj þ sj sj  sj Þ=sj sj :
ð9Þ
The Allen partial elasticity of substitution rjk gives us the
percentage change in the ratio of Lj to Lk with respect to the
percentage change in the ratio of wk to wj. The Allen partial
elasticity of substitution is directly estimated as the coefficient on relative wages using the CES approach—equations
(8a) and (8b). To convert the Allen partial elasticity of substitution into an elasticity of factor demand, we multiply by
the factor share:
gjj ¼ sj rjj ¼ @ ln Li =@ ln wj :

ð10Þ

We report elasticities of substitution for each of the three
estimation strategies in table 6. Factor shares are computed
by taking the sample means of the data. For the translog
approach, we report the implied elasticities from estimating
equation (6). The coefficients on affiliate wages imply that
foreign labor in horizontal multinationals substitutes for
home labor in both high- and low-income affiliate locations.
For vertical multinationals, the results are the opposite:
workers in low-income locations are complementary to
domestic employees. As expected, the own-price elasticity
is negative. The results are generally consistent with the
results of our labor demand specification reported in columns 1 and 2.
The point estimates are consistently positive for lowincome affiliate wages but not precisely estimated for highincome affiliate wages. These results imply that across all
specifications, low-income affiliate employment substitutes
for domestic employment. However, when multinationals
are differentiated on the basis of how much they export for
further processing, the results change. Employees in highincome affiliates substitute for domestic employment, while
employees in low-income affiliates complement domestic
employment.
We summarize the effects of factor price changes, trade,
and technical change on U.S. manufacturing employment in
table 7. We combine the coefficient estimates presented in
table 4 with the actual mean changes in wages, investment
prices, trade, research and development employment, and
goods prices taken from table 3. We see that the major
determinants of contraction in U.S. manufacturing parent
employment are (a) falling prices of investment goods
(which incorporate the falling prices of computers) (b) rising real wages in the United States, (c) falling real wages in

low-income affiliate locations, and (d) increasing import
competition. While much of the debate on offshoring
focuses on falling real wages in low-income affiliate locations, the impact of relative wage changes on U.S. parent
labor demand is only one factor that explains contraction in
parent employment. The combined effects of higher domestic wages and falling foreign wages account for only a 6.4%
decline in U.S. employment. In comparison, falling investment prices account for a 13.7% decline and increasing
import competition from low-wage countries accounts for a
2.3% decline in home employment. Moreover, for multinationals that export significant amounts of goods to developing countries for further processing, falling real wages in
low-income affiliates boosted employment.
V.

Conclusion

Over the period 1982 to 1999, domestic employment of
U.S. multinationals contracted by nearly 4 million jobs,
possibly foreshadowing the overall reduction in U.S. manufacturing employment that accelerated from 1999 onwards.
During this period, the number of workers hired by affiliates
in developing countries increased, while real wages paid to
these workers declined. These facts are consistent with the
hypothesis that U.S. parents are exporting low-wage jobs
to low-income countries. In this paper, we show that this
hypothesis is only partly supported by the evidence.
Using data on U.S.-based multinationals from the BEA,
we measure the impact on U.S. manufacturing employment
of changes in foreign affiliate wages, controlling for changing demand conditions, import competition, and technological change. We find that the evidence on the links
between offshoring and domestic employment is mixed and
that the effect depends on both the type and the location of
foreign investment. We conclude that the heterogeneity in
effects is one reason that previous research on this topic has
yielded such apparently contradictory results.
For firms most likely to perform the same tasks in foreign
affiliates and at home, foreign and domestic employees are
substitutes. For these firms, lower wages in affiliate locations are associated with lower employment in the United
States: A 1 percentage point fall in affiliate wages is associated with reductions in parent employment of between
0.009% and 0.598%. However, for firms that do significantly different tasks at home and abroad, foreign and
domestic employment are complements: A 1 percentage
point decline in low-income affiliate wages is associated
with increases in parent employment of between 0.089%
and 0.761%. The complementarity between domestic and
foreign employment for firms where affiliates perform significantly different tasks is consistent with the theoretical
models developed and discussed by Markusen (1989) and
Markusen and Maskus (2001).
Finally, we show that other factors, including falling
investment goods prices and import competition, are quantitatively more important determinants of falling US manufac-
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turing employment. Together these other factors account for
16.02% of the decline in manufacturing employment.
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APPENDIX
Tables
TABLE A1.—COVERAGE OF THE BEA SAMPLE

Year and Variable
1982
Total number of employees in BEA sample (thousands)
Gross product in the BEA sample (U.S. millions of dollars)
Coverage of the BEA sample (in %) relative to gross product
for all firms operating in the United States
Value of dollar export sales by firms in the BEA sample (millions)
Coverage of the BEA sample (in %) relative to exports of all firms
operating in the United States
1989
Total number of employees in BEA sample (thousands)
Gross product in the BEA sample (U.S. millions of dollars)
Coverage of the BEA sample (in %) relative to gross product for
all firms operating in the United States
Value of dollar export sales by firms in the BEA sample (millions)
Coverage of the BEA sample (in %) relative to exports of all firms
operating in the United States
1994
Total number of employees in BEA sample (thousands)
Gross product in the BEA sample (U.S. millions of dollars)
Coverage of the BEA sample (in %) relative to gross product for
all firms operating in the United States
Value of dollar export sales by firms in the BEA sample (millions)
Coverage of the BEA sample (in %) relative to exports of all firms
operating in the United States
1999
Total number of employees in BEA sample (thousands)
Value of dollar export sales by firms in the BEA sample (millions)
Coverage of the BEA sample (in %) relative to exports of all
Firms operating in the United States

Coverage of BEA
Sample in
Manufacturing

Coverage of
BEA Sample
in Services

Coverage of
BEA Sample
in Total U.S.
Economic Activity
(Includes
Manufacturing,
Services, Other,
Wholesale Trade)

11,758.1
421,050
80%

993.8
25,997
6%

18,704.6
796,017
33%

163,383
77%

NA
NA

NA
NA

10,706.8
586,568
67%

1,700
57,090
6%

18,785.4
1,044,884
25%

236,371
65%

NA
NA

NA
NA

9,622.5
690,466
59%

2,653.4
102,520
8%

18,947.4
1,325,945
26%

337,036
59%

NA
NA

NA
NA

7,954.9
441,587
62.5%

2,220,174
NA
NA

23,006.8
NA
NA

Based on Mataloni and Fahim-Nader (1996) and Mataloni and Yorgason (2006).

TABLE A2.—CROSS CHECKING THE ACCURACY OF THE BEA DATABASE

BEA data
Employees of U.S. affiliates in 1999 in Germany
Employees of U.S. affiliates in 1999 in Sweden
German government data (direct U.S. ownership only)
Employees of U.S. affiliates in 1998
Employees of U.S. affiliates in 1999
Employees of U.S. affiliates in 2000
Swedish government data
Employees of U.S. affiliates in 1997 (majority owned only)
Employees of U.S. affiliates in 1998 (majority owned only)
Employees of U.S. affiliates in 1999 (majority owned only)

Imposing a Cut-Off
(reporting requirement of a
balance sheet total of
at least 7 million euros
for Germany; U.S. reporting
requirements vary over
time; no reporting
requirement for Sweden)

Imposing No Cut-Off on
Germany Affiliate Reporting

458,744
67,044

NA
NA

466,941
509,537
488,157

488,866
532,594
509,176

51,138
61,089
78,621

NA
NA
NA
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TABLE A3.—DESCRIPTION OF VARIABLES AND DATA SOURCES
Variable Name

Source

Description

Log Wage (Industry Level)

U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis

Log Wage (Industry Level)

UNIDO

Log Employment

U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis

R&D Share
R&D Share (High-Income Affiliates)
R&D Share (Low-Income Affiliates)

U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis

U.S. Investment Price

NBER Manufacturing
Database

Foreign Investment Price

Penn World Tables

Foreign Consumer Goods Price

Penn World Tables

U.S. Import Penetration

Bernard et al. (2006)

U.S. Import Penetration from
Low-Income Countries

Bernard et al. (2006)

Wages and salaries of employees and employer expenditures for
all employee benefit plans in parents computed separately for
parents, high-income affiliates, and other affiliates and averaged
across industries.
Wages calculated based on surveys administered by UNIDO,
supplemented with secondary sources (such as national
statistical agencies). Wages calculated as compensation divided
by number of employees at the 3-digit ISIC level Revision 2. All
values converted to U.S. dollars using the IMF exchange rate
series rf. Data taken from INDSTAT3, published in 2006 by
UNIDO.
Log of the number of full-time and part-time employees on the
payroll at the end of the fiscal year in all affiliates. However, a
count taken during the year was accepted if it was a reasonable
proxy for the end-of-year number. Computed separately for
parents, high-income affiliates, and other affiliates.
Number of employees in research and development as a
percentage of total employment. Computed separately for U.S.
parents, affiliates in high-income locations, and affiliates in lowincome locations.
This is the variable PIINV in the NBER’s manufacturing
productivity database. It is set to 1 in 1987. It combines separate
deflators for structures and equipment, based on the distribution
of each type of asset in the industry. This is a deflator for new
investment flows, not the existing capital stock. See
www.nber.org.
PPP price of domestic investment calculated from the PWT 6.1.
See appendix for PWT 6.1 for more details or http://
pwt.econ.upenn.edu.
PPP price of consumption goods calculated from the PWT 6.1.
See appendix for PWT 6.1 for more details or http://
pwt.econ.upenn.edu.
Imports into the United States divided by imports into the United
States plus total production in the United States less exports
from the United States by year by four-digit SIC 1987 revision
code industrial classification.
Share of products in an industry sourced from at least one country
with less than 5% of U.S. per capita GDP

TABLE A4.—ANNUAL CHANGES IN REAL WAGES AND EMPLOYMENT BY REGION AND INCOME

Region
Developed economies
East Asia and Pacifica
Europe and Central Asia
Latin America and Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africab
World
Income Group
High income: OECD
High income: non-OECD
Low income
Lower middle incomec
Upper middle incomed

Average Annual Percentage
Change in Real Wages
(per employee)

Average Annual
Percentage Change
in Employment

1.48
0.28
8.31
1.40
1.88
0.78
4.54
0.21

0.62
4.00
4.29
1.02
3.21
3.77
1.83
1.27

1.07
1.88
3.34
1.39
0.34

0.94
0.29
1.61
1.36
0.20

Madagascar was excluded from the sample due to data inconsistencies. Source: Authors’ calculations based on UNIDO INDSTAT2 data. Time period covered is 1980–2007.
a
The numbers are 0.78% and 4.05%, respectively, if China is excluded from the sample;
b
The numbers are 4.81% and 2.01%, respectively, if South Africa is excluded from the sample
c
The numbers are 1.53% and 1.25%, respectively, if China is excluded from the sample
d
The numbers are 0.28% and 0.23%, respectively, if South Africa is excluded from the sample.
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TABLE A5.—TESTING FOR THE IMPACT OF SELECTION INTO EXIT: HECKMAN CORRECTION
(1)

Log U.S. Industrial Wages
Log Industrial Wages High-Income Countries
Log Industrial Wages Low-Income Countries
Log of the U.S. Price of Capital
Log of the Foreign Price of Capital
Import Penetration
Import Penetration from Low-Wage Countries
R&D (% Sales)
R&D (% Sales) in High-Income Countries
R&D (% Sales) in Low-Income Countries
Log of Industry Sales
Log Affiliate Sales by Industry

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Pooled

Imports from

Exports to
Affiliates

Exports for
Processing

Exports for
Resale

Platform
FDI

0.329
[0.040]**
0.020
[0.035]
0.057
[0.017]**
0.172
[0.040]**
0.076
[0.074]
0.406
[0.202]*
0.054
[0.358]
0.747
[0.451]
0.534
[0.697]
3.642
[2.276]
0.086
[0.032]**
0.088
[0.043]*

0.310
[0.044]**
0.031
[0.039]
0.062
[0.019]**
0.163
[0.040]**
0.082
[0.075]
0.411
[0.202]*
0.056
[0.359]
0.753
[0.451]
0.538
[0.697]
3.788
[2.282]
0.087
[0.032]**
0.087
[0.043]*
0.553
[0.534]
0.377
[0.515]
0.217
[0.371]
0.031
[0.039]
0.078
[0.069]
3,177
0.08

0.415
[0.045]**
0.066
[0.043]
0.080
[0.020]**
0.150
[0.039]**
0.061
[0.074]
0.414
[0.200]*
0.010
[0.356]
0.713
[0.450]
0.377
[0.692]
3.626
[2.259]
0.078
[0.032]*
0.092
[0.042]*
2.265
[1.560]
1.114
[0.531]*
0.463
[0.166]**
0.039
[0.039]
0.070
[0.068]
3,177
0.09

0.381
[0.045]**
0.039
[0.041]
0.084
[0.019]**
0.128
[0.039]**
0.066
[0.074]
0.407
[0.201]*
0.040
[0.357]
0.872
[0.451]
0.448
[0.694]
3.599
[2.267]
0.084
[0.032]**
0.089
[0.043]*
2.172
[1.902]
0.772
[0.754]
3.923
[1.299]**
0.036
[0.039]
0.070
[0.068]
3,177
0.08

0.372
[0.042]**
0.049
[0.038]
0.062
[0.019]**
0.197
[0.039]**
0.071
[0.074]
0.409
[0.201]*
0.024
[0.356]
0.581
[0.451]
0.466
[0.694]
3.607
[2.263]
0.081
[0.032]**
0.092
[0.042]*
3.045
[01878]
1.946
[0.931]*
0.329
[0.245]
0.034
[0.039]
0.081
[0.068]
3,177
0.09

0.380
[0.102]**
0.012
[0.087]
0.079
[0.045]
0.157
[0.040]**
0.077
[0.075]
0.404
[0.202]*
0.050
[0.359]
0.774
[0.452]
0.537
[0.697]
3.670
[2.278]
0.086
[0.032]**
0.085
[0.043]*
0.083
[0.154]
0.051
[0.129]
0.035
[0.067]
0.032
[0.039]
0.077
[0.069]
3,177
0.08

Log U.S. Industrial Wages  Vertical
Log Industrial Wages High-Income Countries  Vertical
Log Industrial Wages Low-Income Countries  Vertical
0.031
[0.039]
0.080
[0.068]
3,177
0.08

Lambda for 1994
Lambda for 1999
Observations
R2

Standard errors corrected for arbitrary heterskedasticity are in brackets. *Significant at 5%. **Significant at 1%. Each of columns 2–6 includes an interaction term between the wage measures and vertical integration defined at the firm level as the mean of the variable in the column heading over the entire sample period. All specifications include time dummies.

TABLE A6.—ACTIVITY AT THE INTENSIVE AND EXTENSIVE MARGINS
A: Entry or Exit to and from Low-Wage Countries
Activity 1982–1989
In
Out
Total
Activity 1989–1994
In
Out
Total
Activity 1994–1999
In
Out
Total

B: Entry and Exit to and from Mexico

In

Out

Total

586
85.8%
30
4.39%
616
90.19%

67
9.81%
0
0
67
9.81%

653
95.61%
30
4.39%
683
100%

542
85.33%
53
6.12%
595
91.45%

74
8.55%
0
0
74
8.55%

616
93.88%
53
6.12%
669
100%

516
86.69%
36
4.17%
552
90.86%

79
9.14%
0
0
79
9.14%

595
95.83%
36
4.17%
631
100%

Activity 1982–1989
In
Out
Total
Activity 1989–1994
In
Out
Total
Activity 1994–1999
In
Out
Total

In

Out

Total

313
78.67%
51
10.82%
364
89.49%

72
11.51%
0
0
72
11.51%

415
89.18%
21
10.82%
436
100%

331
89.21%
29
5.51%

33
5.27%
0
0

364
94.48%
29
5.51%

360
94.72%

33
5.27%

393
100%

340
89.18%
26
3.67%
366
92.85%

20
7.15%
0
0
20
7.15%

360
96.33%
26
3.67%
386
100%

The number entries are the counts of parents belonging in each cell. The percentages below these numbers are the shares of affiliate employment accounted for by the row column entries.
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TABLE A7.—LOW-INCOME AFFILIATE EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT SHARES
BY COUNTRY OVER TIME
1982

1989

1994

Low-income affiliate employment by country
Mexico
208,860
496,872
501,066
Brazil
332,370
462,105
468,184
China
77
11,131
33,560
Malaysia
55,583
50,055
73,073
Thailand
14,804
18,375
25,460
South Africa
76,728
32,024
30,432
India
27,798
37,032
21,193
Argentina
63,130
35,956
53,580
Philippines
73,651
63,430
68,278
Total
853,001
1,206,979
1,274,824
Low-income affiliate share of employment by country
Mexico
19.63%
35.36%
31.63%
Brazil
31.24
32.89
29.56
China
0.01
0.79
2.12
Malaysia
5.22
3.56
4.61
Thailand
1.39
1.31
1.61
South Africa
7.21
2.28
1.92
India
2.61
2.64
1.34
Argentina
5.93
2.56
3.38
Philippines
6.92
4.51
4.31
Total
80.17
85.91
80.48

1999
654,076
384,854
133,371
85,365
81,054
53,288
48,124
41,007
40,980
1,522,118
37.69%
15.25
9.82
4.57
4.34
2.85
2.58
2.20
2.19
81.48

TABLE A8.—CLASSIFICATION OF COUNTRIES INTO LOW-VERSUS HIGH-INCOME CATEGORIES
Countries classified as low income by the World Bank

Countries classified as high income by the World Bank

Estonia (1,470), Guyana (1,504), China (1,579), Malawi (1,689),
Romania (1,866), Sri Lanka (1,898), Ukraine (2,151), India (2,325),
Dominican Republic (2,763), Tanzania (3,057), Zimbabwe (3,109),
Uzbekistan (3,136), Zambia (3,152), Vietnam (3,326), Indonesia
(3,401), Botswana (3,517), Pakistan (3,631), Nigeria (3,940),
Honduras (4,111), Thailand (4,168), Costa Rica (4,236), Yemen,
Rep. (4,248), Senegal (4,318), Philippines (4,427), Slovak R.
(4,531), Colombia (4,603), El Salvador (4,622), Egypt, Arab Rep.
(4,756), Fiji (4,824), Kenya (5,098), Malaysia (5,334), Hungary
(5,426), Ghana (5,475), Poland (5,540), Jamaica (5,557), Ecuador
(5,596), Panama (6,453), Mexico (6,465), Guatemala (6,786),
Trinidad and Tobago (6,994), Venezuala, RB (7,393), Swaziland
(7,500), Russian Federation (7,527), Uruguay (7,997), Turkey
(8,370), Morocco (8,422), Tunisia (9,058), Nicaragua (9,206), Malta
(9,211), Chile (9,485), South Africa (10,257), Barbados (10,480),
Peru (11,065), Brazil (11,227)

Singapore (11,885), Portugal (14,236), Bahamas (14,288), Taiwan
(14,699), Saudi Arabia (14,912), Korea, Rep. (15,549), Bahrain
(16,047), Netherlands Antilles (16,596), Hong Kong, China
(17,478), New Zealand (17,736), Argentina (18,003), Israel
(19,572), Greece (22,855), Australia (23,313), Ireland (23,392),
Spain (25,848), United Kingdom (26,487), Sweden (27,380), Italy
(30,574), Austria (31,209), Finland (32,049), Denmark (32,934),
Norway (33,022), United Arab Emirates (33,603), France (33,628),
Aruba (34,745), Canada (35,268), Netherlands (35,973), Belgium
(40,134), Luxembourg (43,614), Germany (44,146), Switzerland
(44,248), Japan (57,126)

Nominal manufacturing wages in 1994 U.S. dollars in parentheses.

